73
(No. 35.)
72
(B.)
Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Sir R. Macleay (Peking).
(Telegraphic.)
MY telegram No. 30: Canton.
Foreign Office, January 29, 1926).
I gather Mr. O'Malley's conference at Hong Kong has not produced any very helpful recommendation. Methods hitherto suggested for dealing with this most difficult problem are:-
1. Force. Ultimatum to Canton to stop boycott and expel Russians, to be followed, if necessary, by aerial bombardment of forts and Whampoa Military College. This idea has always been rejected as involving actual warfare and also recognition of an independent Canton Government. We have also assumed that 11 would unite China against us and revive boycott throughout country.
Do
you think
this last objection still holds good, and do you generally deprecate this line of action? 2. Blockade. Either (a) joint international action in co-operation with Washington Powers, or (b) independent action by ourselves in insisting on all ships with cargo for or from Canton unloading at Hong Kong. (b) would inevitably mean friction unless tacit consent of Powers concerned were obtained. (a) received scant encouragement when suggested by Mr. Palairet to his colleagues last year. Is it worth urging more strongly now concerted action on the representatives of principal Powers here? Have the Cantonese broken any treaty, either in letter or in spirit? Can such infraction of treaty be made a ground for joint action? Has not Canton, in fact, closed open door against us? And are not certain Powers, by taking advantage of boycott, themselves infringing articles 1 (3 and 4) and 3 of Washington Nine-Power Treaty and is not action under article 7 called for? Could Russian ships be intercepted and detained without serious consequences?
3. Assistance with money or men, to an anti-Red leader. But where is he to be found? Will Wu or Sun ever be strong enough to coerce Canton? The strongest factor in Canton seems to be General Chiang and cadets. Is there no possibility of detaching him from the Bolsheviks (a) by direct negotiation; (b) by influencing him through moderate Cantonese? Or do you consider that our general policy of non-intervention between contending parties in China should be adhered to even as regards Canton?
4. Pressure on Moscow to recall Canton agents and cease propaganda. Only effective threat would be withdrawal of Moscow mission, and would even that succeed? Might it not merely serve to advertise throughout China our impotence and proportionately to advertise Bolshevik success against us?
5. Conciliation-Until breakdown of last negotiations with Hong Kong there seemed possibility of a settlement, but it failed owing to intimidation and pressure by Russians and extremists. What are actual Cantonese demands? Are they still the five demands reported in His Majesty's consul-general's despatch to Peking No. 50 of 29th June, namely: (1) Apology for 23rd June incident; (2) punishment of officials: (3) withdrawal of naval units; (4) return of Shameen; (5) compensation? What is objection to Hong Kong Government negotiating with strikers dírect?
If we are to cope successfully with Canton we must first know what their real or professed grievances are, e.g., recognition of local Government, customs independence, Hong Kong interference with telegraphs, retention of Shameen in its present state as a fortified enclave, &c. What are they? If real, these grievances must be met sooner or later. We must weigh carefully whether moment is not fast approaching, if not already with us, when fiction by which Canton is controlled by Peking should be abandoned as merely hampering our action at Canton, whether friendly or hostile. Please let us have your considered opinion.
So long as Russians give Cantonese arms and money and we give nothing, Cantonese, or at least some sections of them, will prefer Russians. What can we make as counter-offer? We can think of nothing except possibly control of local customs revenues, for which they have been asking since 1918.
Finally, should Boxer indemnity delegation visit Canton? And, if so, should they go soon? They would be a sign of friendliness to moderate Cantonese, and visit would test whether there is any possibility of co-operation on a non-contentious matter. Canton has a claim to benefit from Boxer funds. Should it be given an annual grant for port and municipal improvement, &c., which is so loudly advocated?
This might serve as subsidy for good behaviour and counterbalance Russian subsidies.
We realise that these questions are hard to answer and that you will no doubt wish to consult Sir J. Jamieson before replying; also that you may wish to await arrival of Mr. O'Malley and hear from him personally his account of his discussions with the former and Governor on his way through Hong Kong. But matter is pressing, and Parliament meets on 2nd February, when we shall certainly be pressed, for criticism is gaining ground both in the press and influential business circles at our apparent inaction and inability to grapple with the problem.
Please repeat to His Majesty's consul-general. Canton, with instructions to consult Hong Kong before sending you his observations.
(C.)
Sir R. Macleay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.-(Received January 30.)
(No. 39) (Telegraphic.)
CANTON situation.
Peking, January 30, 1926.
I would like to reserve my considered views on proposals of conference held at Hong Kong, 25th January, telegraphic report of which will have reached you through Colonial Office, until O'Malley's arrival here, but, in the meantime, and as matter is urgent, I venture to submit following comments:
1. Idea that Chinese representative on League of Nations could be induced to join in a motion of censure by League on conduct of Canton Government is, I fear, quite fallacious, and such censure would not have the smallest effect on Bolshevik element now in control there. Any pressure which League of Nations might be persuaded to apply would be weakened if not nullified by fact that America is not member and would presumably not participate in any action decided on. (See my despatch No. 220, Confidential, of 15th April, 1924, for general attitude of Chinese towards League.)
2. I agree that war with Canton would imperil future trade relations between Great Britain and China. It would presumably involve blockade, if not actual occupation by British forces, for an indefinite period of the town of Canton, and, by immediately exposing British community, officials and interests in places like Shameen, Hoi How, Swatow and Amoy to retaliation by Red forces, would necessitate their evacuation and temporary abandonment.
Apart from international complications which might ensue if we acted alone, it seems problematical whether any lasting improvement in relations between Hong Kong and Canton could be thereby secured and whether result in the long run might not be to divert permanently more trade from both places than has already been lost by strike and boycott, or, in other words, whether remedy would not be worse than the disease.
I further believe such aggression on our part would immediately lead to a fresh outburst of anti-British feeling all over China, in spite of the fact that there are growing signs of formation of a coalition between Wu Pei-fu and Chang and other important military leaders against the Kuomintang extremists and separatist and Bolshevik tendencies in Canton and elsewhere, to whom any forcible action by us in the south might be expected to be welcome. Our experience last summer showed that Chang, who was so constantly pressing us to co-operate with him against Bolshevik influences in China, not only took no steps to dissociate himself from violent anti- British demonstrations which followed Shanghai incident, but even expressed open sympathy with movement.
3. I am therefore forced to conclude that our wisest course is to hold our hand and to see it patiently through in the hope that impending events in China will lead to a weakening of Bolshevik influences in Canton and to the ascendancy there of a more moderate party with whom it will be possible for Hong Kong Government to resettle by negotiation.
Should events above referred to result in establishment of a Coalition Government in Peking of the more Conservative leaders, and, after suppression of extremist and Bolshevik elements in other parts of China, lead to a combined attack on Canton, and such a campaign seems to be already seriously contemplated by Wu Pei-fu, question of our supporting or actively assisting coalition might arise should it have been found impossible in the meantime to come to some satisfactory local arrangement.
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